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THE ANTIDUMPING ACT AND THE FUTURE 
OF EAST-WEST TRADE 
Peter Buck Feller* 
INTRODUCTION 
T HERE has been in recent years a marked change in American attitudes, both official and private, toward expanded trade 
relations with the communist countries of Eastern Europe.1 As a 
result the United States has taken a series of significant steps to 
achieve a meaningful commercial rapprochement with Soviet bloc 
nations. In 1960, for example, the United States extended most-
favored-nation treatment to importations from Poland,2 and in 1964 
negotiations with Rumania produced an accord which permitted 
freer Rumanian access to the United States market for purchases 
of industrial goods3 and made available credit guarantees through 
the Export-Import Bank to finance such purchases.4 During the 
same period the Government paved the way for the sale of 140 mil-
lion dollars worth of American wheat to the U .S.S.R. 5 
Developments in 1966 were even more dramatic. In May the 
Administration submitted an East-West trade bill6 to Congress to 
authorize the President to grant trade concessions, particularly most-
favored-nation tariff status, to Soviet bloc countries on an individual 
basis and under circumstances advantageous to the United States. 
• Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B. 1960, University of Pennsylvania; 
J.D. 1964, American University; LL.M. 1967, George Washington University Law 
Center.-Ed. 
1. "Eastern Europe," "the East," "Soviet bloc" and similar terms are generally used 
in this study to refer to the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East 
Germany, Rumania, and Hungary. Albania is excluded, because of its current align-
ment with Red China; Yugoslavia is excluded because of its independence from the 
Soviet bloc. Terms, such as "the ·west" and "the industrial ·west," refer to the mem-
bership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, ·west Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, The United Kingdom and The United States. 
2. Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on East-West Trade, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 275 (1965) [hereinafter cited as East-West Trade Hearings]. 
3. Szulc, U.S. Acts To Spur Rumanian Trade, New York Times, June 2, 1964, at I, 
col. 6. 
4. East-West Trade Hearings 129. 
5. Hess, First $25 Million in Grain Is Reported Sold to Soviet, New York Times, 
January 3, 1964, at I, col. 6. 
6. Identical bills were introduced and referred to the Senate Finance Committee 
and the House Ways and Means Committee. S. 3363, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 
15212, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Albania and East Germany would not be eligible 
for trade concessions under the East-'\\Test Trade bill. 
[ 115] 
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Several months later the President announced the substantial reduc-
tion of export controls on nonstrategic items, 7 as well as other mea-
sures designed to develop and strengthen economic ties with Eastern 
Europe.8 
To some extent the East-West trade ferment in the United States 
reflects approval of the much-publicized economic reform movement 
in the Soviet Union and its bloc partners9 which, with certain ex-
ceptions, has been characterized by decentralization of manage-
ment, 10 rekindled cost consciousness, and a growing interest in 
consumer production.11 The sweep of Soviet economic reappraisal 
has, among other things, called into question the role of foreign 
trade in the Soviet economy. In that connection export planners 
were urged during the 23rd Party Congress to develop marketing 
techniques which would attract customers in the West.12 The Soviet 
Union, therefore, shows modest but unmistakable signs of emerging 
from its tradition of autarchic remoteness vis-a-vis the industrial 
West, as evidenced by the fact that its trade turnover with the West 
increased by 126% between 1959 and 1964, while the total volume 
of its international trade over the same period increased by only 
78%.13 Soviet trade with the United States, although remaining at 
a comparatively low level, nevertheless rose from 66 million dollars 
in 1961 to 87 million dollars in 1965.14 
The possibility of a substantial increase in trade between the 
United States and East European countries other than the U.S.S.R. 
7. Appoximately 400 items which previously could be shipped to communist na-
tions only under a validated export license were approved for inclusion on the general 
license list maintained by the Department of Commerce under the Export Control 
Act of 1949 §§ 1-12, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-32 (Supp. 1965), formerly 63 Stat. 7 (1949). 
8. :Bigart, Johnson Acts To Improve U.S. Ties to East Europe-Steps Are Outlined 
for Easing Curbs on Trade and Travel, New York Times, October 8, 1966, at 1, col. 8. 
9. "Present trends toward decentralization of the economic systems of some of the 
Eastern countries deserve a positive response from the West." CoMMITI'EE FOR Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EAST-WEST TRADE: A COMMON POLICY FOR TilE WEST 18 (1965). 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY, a four-part study prepared for the FOREIGN 
ECONOMIC POLICY SUBCOMM. OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 89TH CONG,, 2D SESS,, pt. 4, 
873-1093 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as NEW DIRECTIONS]. See also remarks 
of A. E. Albright, trustee of the Foreign Policy Association, reprinted in 113 CONG. 
REc. 6630 (daily ed. June 5, 1967): "At the beginning of 1967 Czechoslovakia took 
steps to free itself from the Soviet economic prison of central planning and adopted 
a near-capitalistic credo which calls for an individual enterprise to be measured by 
profits arising from actual sales to customers." 
10. See :Burck, The Toughest Management Job in the World, FORTUNE, July 1, 
1966, at 73. 
11. :Burck, The Auspidous Rise of the Soviet Consumer, FORTUNE, Aug. 1966, at 130. 
12. NEW DIRECTIONS 919, 937. 
13. Id. at 939. 
14. Id. at 925. 
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appears particularly promising in view of the progressive loosening 
of Soviet domination over its bloc partners.15 Having embarked on 
a course of relative political and economic independence, several 
bloc countries have adopted important measures for stimulating 
exports to the West in order to finance Western imports, especially 
imports of modern equipment and technology.16 Rumania has ac-
cordingly increased the West's share of her foreign trade from 20% 
in 1958 to 32% in the 1961-1964 period,17 while the over-all volume 
of trade between the United States and Czechoslovakia in 1965 
reached 40 million dollars, an increase of 66% over its 1964 level.18 
It must be recognized, however, that where the United States is 
concerned there are many technical and legal problems which beset 
the prospects for advancing East-West trade. Among these, few are 
as confounding as the application of the antidumping law to im-
portations from state-controlled economies. 
Dumping, which may be defined as "price discrimination be-
tween national markets,"19 is a trade practice condemned by vir-
tually all nations having market economies.20 Under United States 
law the practice of dumping is countered by the imposition of an 
additional duty against the tainted imports, based upon a compari-
son made between the export price of the commodity in question 
and its domestic price in the exporting country. I£ the export price 
is lower, a dumping margin is said to exist, and upon a determina-
tion that the price differential causes injury to American industry, 
a dumping duty equal to the price differential is levied. 
Because of the peculiarities of price formation in Communist 
15. See Prasad, Prague Goes Pragmatic, 11 CoLUM. J. OF WoRLD Bus. 73 (1967) for 
the observation: "As of the beginning of this year, Czechoslovakia became the first 
communist country apart from maverick. Yugoslavia to try to disjoint its economic 
system from the straitjacket of Soviet-type central planning." 
16. Id. at 919-20. See report of interview with Harold Francis Linder, Chairman of 
the Export-Import Bank, in That Trade Bridge to the East, FINANCE, March 1967, 
at 19. 
17. NEW DIRECTIONS 910. 
18. Hamouz, Czechoslovakian Minister of Foreign Trade, International Trade With-
out Barriers appearing in a special New York Times supplement entitled Czechoslo-
vakia an Interesting Country for Travel .•. for Trade, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1966, § 11 
at 2, col. 3. 
19. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1923). 
20 "[D]umping, by which products of one country are introduced into the com-
merce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be con-
demned .•.. " General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI, para. l [hereinafter 
referred to as GATTJ. The GATT in its original form may be found in 61 Stat. pts. 
5-6 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950). For lists of the numerous protocols and treaties since 
1947 which have amended or affected the GATT, see U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3, Rev. l 
(1963); GATT, Status of Multilateral Protocols, PROT/2/Rev. 2 (Aug. 1966). 
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countries, both with regard to export commodities and those in-
tended for domestic consumption, the applicability of traditional 
antidumping concepts to communist price discrimination, and the 
usefulness of the Antidumping Act of 192!21 in coping with it, are 
questions which should be examined and resolved before moves 
toward freer trade between East and West reach full stride.22 The 
essence of the problem was captured in a 1963 statement by the then 
Senator Humphrey: "The present act is ineffective in preventing 
dumping from communist countries, which can control their home 
prices by state fiat."23 
It is the purpose of this study to illustrate and explore various 
aspects of the problem and to offer alternative methods of dealing 
with it. 
I. PRICING IN THE COMMAND ECONOMY 
For the most part domestic prices are fixed in Soviet bloc coun-
tries by a central planning authority according to certain economic 
precepts which vary somewhat from country to country.24 Price lev-
els generally reflect the planners' calculations of market equilibrium 
as between arbitrary production or import goals, on the one hand, 
and projected demand elasticity, on the other. Domestic prices, 
therefore, ordinarily bear no relation to cost of production. I£ a par-
ticular commodity price exceeds the cost of production and distri-
bution, the differential corresponds in a general way to the incidence 
of taxation arid profit as known in the West. Conversely, a price 
below the cost of production and distribution may be considered as 
subsidized.25 
Foreign trade in the communist countries of Eastern Europe is 
conducted through state agencies organized as legal corporations, 
each of which is given monopoly jurisdiction in specified commodity 
21. 19 u.s.c. §§ 160-73 (1964). 
22. See Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations 
with East European Countries and the Soviet Union 17 (April 29, 1965). 
23. 109 CoNG. REc. 6444 (1963). Professor Harold Berman, testifying before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1965, observed: "[T]here is a special difficulty 
in preventing dumping by Communist countries due to the artificiality of their do-
mestic price systems. It is virtually impossible to compare Soviet ruble costs of pro-
duction of tin, for example, with the dollar or pound price obtained abroad. ·we need 
a new definition of dumping that would be applicable to this situation .•.• " East-
West Trade Hearings 131. 
24. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade Problems Be-
tween Countries Having Different Economic and Social S)•stems, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 
46/34, at 26 (1964). 
25. Id. at 27, 28. 
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categories.26 The function of these agencies is to implement the 
planned import and export targets of the state under the general 
supervision of the ministry of foreign trade. In that connection, the 
state trading agencies have independent contractual capacity to deal 
with foreign business entities.27 
Goods purchased abroad by the state agencies for domestic con-
sumption are usually resold in the home market at a price set by 
the planning authority to coincide with that of like commodities 
domestically produced. In this way the internal price structure tends 
to remain insulated from the influence of outside economic con-
ditions. For the same reason, export prices are set by the state agen-
cies without regard to cost of production calculations or to domestic 
price levels. Instead, export prices are governed by average world 
market prices for the commodities concerned.28 
The prices (converted to domestic currency) paid by the state 
trading corporation for commodity imports are registered in the 
accounts of the corporation, together with the domestic prices as-
signed by the planning authority for such commodities. Any gain 
or loss resulting from a comparison of these two figures is borne by 
the central budget of the government. Similarly, commodities des-
tined for export are accounted to the corporation at their domestic 
price, and also at their sales price in realized foreign exchange value 
(converted to domestic currency). Again, the central budget registers 
any loss or "profit" resulting from export sales.29 
II. THE CAUSES OF DUMPING-EAST AND WEST 
The factors which cause an exporter in a market economy to 
engage in dumping activities differ somewhat from those influencing 
a state trading agency. Although dumping may occur for a variety 
of reasons, the classic dumping situation, to which antidumping 
26. An excellent compendium of articles probing various legal, economic and po-
litical issues related to state trading appears in (pts. 1 &: 2), 24 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 
241, 367 (1959). 
27. Prepared by LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS for the SEN-
ATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89nt CONG., lsr SESS., BACKGROUND STUDY ON EAsr-
WEST TRADE 44, 45 (Comm. Print 1965). 
28. Id. 
29. United Nations Conference, supra note 24, at 29. See generally H. KoHLER, Eco-
NOMic INTEGRATION IN THE SOVIET BLOC (1965); J. MONTIAS, CENTRAL PLANNING IN POLAND 
(1962); G. PATTERSON, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE POLICY ISSUES 1945-
1965 (1966); F. PRYOR, THE Cm.rMUNIST FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM (1963); Holzman, Foreign 
Trade Behavior of Planned Economies, reproduced in a collection of essays honoring 
Alexander Gerschenkron, entitled INDUSTRIALIZATION IN Two SYsrEMs 237 (Rosovsky 
ed. 1966). 
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legislation is primarily directed, involves a foreign monopoly or 
cartel which enjoys a degree of market leverage in its own region 
sufficient to enable it to finance low-priced exports through arti-
ficially high prices at home for the predatory purpose of subduing 
competition in the importing country. A successfully-waged price 
war in this context will bring market dominance to the dumper 
and thereafter permit him to exact a monopoly price in the import-
ing country in order to recoup losses and maximize profits.30 There 
may, however, be other reasons for an exporter in a market economy 
to engage in dumping. For example, a producer may be faced at 
the end of a business season with a casual over-stock of goods result-
ing from miscalculations of domestic demand.31 Rather than under-
cut his own price in established markets, he may prefer to sell the 
surplus in an untried or occasional market abroad at a low price 
calculated to give him an immediate turnover and thereby free his 
facilities for production runs of new models or lines. Although this 
type of dumping does not normally involve predatory intent, it must 
nevertheless be considered a trade evil to the extent that it threatens 
market stability.32 Accidental production surpluses may also occur 
in communist countries and similarly may give rise to dumping ex-
port prices. 
A proqucer in a market economy may also wish to enter a foreign 
market already saturated by existing competitors, both native and 
foreign. To obtain customer familiarity and acceptance, he may 
feel it necessary to lower his normal price on a temporary basis in 
order to overcome his "newcomer" disadvantage. His purpose is to 
gain a foothold in the foreign market, rather than to dominate 
or monopolize it. As such, his purpose would not ordinarily be con-
sidered predatory, since he will presumably increase his price to a 
competitive level once market entry is achieved. State trading agen-
cies, like market economy exporters, will probably also be influenced 
by market entry handicaps in pricing commodities for export. Price 
cutting to compensate for such disadvantages, in fact, is likely to 
be more extensive where communist countries are concerned, since 
in addition to the usual "newcomer" handicap, a state agency may 
have to overcome the absence of a servicing or distribution organi-
zation; lack of spare parts; uncertainty on the part of a prospective 
30. See Yntema, The Influence of Dumping on Monopoly Price, 36 J. OF POL. EcoN, 
686 (1928). 
31. VINER, supra note 19, at 23-34. 
32. Id. 
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purchaser as to continued supply, or his fear of blacklisting; or 
anticommunist attitudes in general.33 
Other considerations which affect the pattern of export pricing 
in planned economies have no counterpart in the industrial nations 
of the West. Managers of the state trading agencies, for instance, 
tend to emphasize export quota fulfillment as the measurement of 
success for the state-planned export program. The incentive, there-
fore, is to sacrifice "profits," as known in the West, by cutting prices 
to insure the sale of commodities earmarked for export.34 
Communist states may also practice price discrimination to ob-
tain hard currency to finance the importation of needed goods, or 
to maintain trade relations with underdeveloped nations, in which 
the trade balance is usually unfavorable. Abnormally low export 
prices, therefore, may reflect nothing more than the fact that a pre-
mium is placed on the acquisition of hard currency to offset a drain 
on the state's hard currency and gold reserves.35 Many experts be-
lieve that of the past occurrences of communist dumping, especially 
by the U.S.S.R., the bulk have been caused by an acute need for 
convertible currency.36 
Inasmuch as state trading corporations generally attempt to price 
exports in line with the average world market price for like com-
modities, some dumped shipments may be explained by inadequate 
price information available to, or collected by, these corporations. 
·while, theoretically, a communist state could set export prices at 
dumping levels in order to drive out competition in a foreign mar-
ket, as in the classic Western dumping situation previously dis-
cussed, there is no evidence that this has ever been done or that it 
is likely to motivate bloc countries.37 It is true that all the resources 
of the state would be available to finance such a venture, which 
would generate a degree of market power far in excess of that which 
33. Wilczynski, Dumping and Central Planning, 74 J. OF PoL. EcoN. 250, 258 (1966). 
34. Nove, The Problem of "Success Indicators" in Soviet Industry, 25 EcoNOMICA 1 
(New Series 1958). 
35. Wilczynski, supra note 33, at 252. 
36. East-West Trade Hearings 131 (Berman): 
The problem of dumping occasionally arises in connection with the Communist 
system of foreign trade, not because the Communist countries wish to disrupt 
world markets but because they sometimes face acute temporary shortages of 
foreign exchange and therefore must sell their goods quickly or because they must 
undersell others in order to get a share of the market. 
See Hazard, State Trading in History and Theory, 24 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PRoB. 243, 246 
(1959). 
37. Wilczynski, supra note 33, at 259. 
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the average Western monopoly could muster.38 Nevertheless, the 
long-run interests of bloc countries, from a strictly economic stand-
point, are better served by the avoidance of dumping and the politi-
cal and economic countermoves which it might bring.39 
It must be recognized, however, that, apart from economic con-
siderations, market disruption may serve the political objectives of 
communist states. Chairman Khrushchev made this quite clear in 
1955 when he admitted that "we value trade least for economic 
reasons and most for political reasons."40 Though a decade has 
passed and Khrushchev has been ousted, it should not be assumed 
that this dictum has been entirely abandoned as a principle of trade 
in the Soviet world. Economic warfare, therefore, may give rise to 
predatory dumping of a primarily political, rather than economic, 
nature. On the other side of the ledger, although Western nations 
have on occasion complained that bloc countries have engaged in 
this kind of economic warfare, the supporting evidence is by no 
means clear; some experts consider that dumping by Soviet bloc 
nations for purposes of market disruption has been minimal.41 
Nevertheless, the potential for politically-motivated dumping should 
not be overlooked or underestimated.42 
38. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN FREE-MARKET AND CONTROLLED 
EcoNOMIES 13 (1943) (memorandum by Jacob Viner). 
39. "It should be emphasized also that it can hardly be in the interests of the 
Eastern planned economies, other than in exceptional cases, to price their exports to 
any great extent below the real costs." COMl\UTIEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 9, at 25. "It is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet leaders recognize that, on 
the whole, a disruption of world markets is not to their own interests both because 
the Soviet economy depends on such markets and because a deliberate policy of large-
scale dumping would stimulate retaliatory measures on the part of other governments." 
Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economics: 
The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 482, 504 (1959). 
40. Quoted in East-West Trade Hearings 97 (Dobriansky). 
41. "The centralization of decisions in the monolithic state and the institutional 
framework under which foreign trade is conducted, no doubt, provide an ideal setup 
for waging economic warfare in peacetime. What is surprising is how little advantage 
of this the bloc countries have taken so far, even though there were many golden 
opportunities .•.• " Wilczynski, supra note 33, at 261. "From the examination which 
I have made of the charges of dumping that have been levied against the Soviets, it 
has seemed to me that it has not been their intent to disrupt world markets.'' East-
West Trade Hearings 122 (Berman). See also GERSCHENKRON, EcONOMIC RELATIONS 
WITH THE U.S.S.R. 44 (1945) (papers submitted to the Comm. on International Eco-
nomic Policy by its Advisory Comm. on Economics). 
42. "State trading is unique in its relation to economic warfare, in that it is the 
only commercial policy by which the economic, political and military interests of the 
state are automatically and simultaneously considered in making decisions about com-
mercial transactions.'' Allen, State Trading and Economic Warfare, 24 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 257, 274 (1959). "In the case of tin, Soviet dumping kicked the bottom 
out of free-world tin prices this past fall ...• The Soviets could easily have based 
their activities on a combination of a need for dollars and a surplus of tin and 
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III. THE UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING Acr 
With the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 the United States 
adopted a national antitrust policy which has been enlarged and 
refined by subsequent legislation, administrative practice, and judi-
cial interpretation, and now boasts an impressive array of weapons 
to protect the competitive nature of the domestic market from those 
forces which would restrict it. It became apparent during the first 
quarter of this century that the concentration of economic power 
in foreign cartels also posed a threat to the maintenance of healthy 
competition in the United States. The Antidumping Act43 was 
therefore added to the antitrust arsenal in 1921 to counteract what 
was conceived to be the international equivalent of predatory price 
discrimination at home.44 
It is not price discrimination per se which the Act seeks to coun-
ter, but rather injurious price discrimination in the commercial 
importation of merchandise into the United States. The Act, con-
sequently, reflects a traditional protectionist impulse as well as an 
antitrust purpose.45 Responsibility for determining the two substan-
tive issues is divided between the Treasury Department, which makes 
determinations concerning price discrimination, and the Tariff Com-
mission, which handles the injury questions.46 If investigation by 
aluminum; political objectives could have been secondary. But this might have also 
been a 'show of strength'." Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 
24 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 369, 379 (1959). "The idea of foreign trade and investment 
for mutual economic gain conducted within a framework of political neutrality is 
foreign to communist ideology." Mikesell & Wells, State Trading in the Sino-Soviet 
Bloc, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 450 (1959). 
43. For general discussions of the Antidumping Act see Baier, Substantive Inter-
pretations Under the Antidumping Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United 
States, 17 STAN. L. REv. 409 (1965); Coudert, The Application of the United States 
Antidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 189 
(1965); Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States 
Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 44 (1958); Hendrick, The 
United States Antidumping Act, 58 AM. J. !NT'L. L. 914 (1964); Kohn, The Anti-
dumping Act: Its Administration and Place in American Trade Policy, 60 MICH. L. 
REv. 407 (1962). 
44. Adams &: Dirlam, Dumping, Antitrust Policy, and Economic Power, 14 Bus. 
TOPI~ 20 (Spring 1966). See also Hearings Before the Foreign Economic Policy Sub-
comm. of the Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 160 (1955) 
("The Anti-Dumping Act, fundamentally is to foreign trade what the Robinson-
Patman Act is to domestic trade." Statement of Vv. J. Barnhard). 
45. See Comment, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust Law?, 74 YALE L.J. 
707 (1965). See also Prosterman, Withholding of Appraisement Under the United States 
Anti-Dumping Act: Protectionism or Unfair-Competition Law?, 41 WASH, L. REv. 315 
(1966). 
46. Before 1954 the Treasury Department alone administered the Act. The present 
procedure was established by the Customs Simplification Act, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1954). 
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both agencies discloses that injurious price discrimination exists, the 
Secretary of the Treasury publishes a dumping finding in the Federal 
Register. Subsequent importations of the type of merchandise covered 
by the findings undergo a special appraisement process, in addition 
to normal customs appraisement, to determine in each case whether 
there is a dumping margin. If the export price is found to be a 
dumped one, a special dumping duty is assessed.47 
During the first stage in the processing of a dumping case the 
Treasury Department, through the Bureau of Customs, conducts an 
inquiry as to whether "sales below fair value" of the imported goods 
in question exist or are threatened. While the key term "fair value" 
is nowhere defined in the statute, the Treasury Department, as a 
matter of practice, regards it as the mathematical equivalent of the 
value established by the application of one of several criteria set 
out in the Act, although these statutory criteria were intended to 
be used as a means of calculating the special dumping duty after 
formal finding of dumping (price discrimination plus injury) had 
been made. There is some dispute as to whether this interpretation 
of the term "fair value" is not unduly restrictive;48 nevertheless, it 
is sufficient for the purposes of this study to state that the issue of 
price discrimination is ordinarily settled by the application of a 
somewhat mechanical price comparison test.49 
The price comparison may be thought of as a weight scale. On 
one side is the "purchase price" or, under certain circumstances, 
the "exporter's sales price." On the other side is the "fair value" 
standard. When the two sides are in balance, there is no dumping 
margin. If "purchase price" or "exporter's sales price" is determined 
to be less than this standard, a dumping margin exists to the extent 
of the differential. Ordinarily, the "fair value" standard is the "for-
eign market value" of merchandise identical to or similar to the 
imported merchandise. Where the "foreign market value" cannot 
be used, the "constructed value" of the goods becomes the measure 
of "fair value." 
"Purchase price" is defined as the price at which imported mer-
chandise has been purchased or agreed to be purchased prior to the 
time of exportation.50 A number of adjustments may, however, be 
necessary to arrive at a suitable price for comparison purposes. 
47. The pertinent regulations are found in 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.6-.13, 16.21-.22 (1963) 
48. Ehrenhaft, supra note 43, at 66-67; Kohn, supra note 43, at 415-16. 
49. 19 C.F.R. § 14.7 (1967). 
50. 19 u.s.c. § 162 (1967). 
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Where the price of the merchandise does not include, for example, 
the cost of containers or other expenses incident to preparing the 
merchandise for shipment to the United States, these cost items are 
added. Any duties or taxes on the manufacturer, producer, or seller 
imposed by the exporting country, but rebated or not collected by 
reason of the exportation, are also added to the price of the mer-
chandise. On the other hand, certain items representing differences 
in the circumstances of sale may be subtracted from the price of the 
imported merchandise to produce a properly adjusted purchase price. 
"Exporter's sales price" is used in lieu of purchase price when 
the exporter and importer are related in ways specified in the Act. 
The term is defined as the price at which the merchandise is sold or 
agreed to be sold by the exporter or for his account, whether before 
or after importation.51 Adjustments, similar to those provided with 
respect to "purchase price,'' are also applicable here. 
"Foreign market value," as defined in the Act, may be either of 
two prices. 152 The preferred and usual determinant of foreign mar-
ket value is "home market price," which is the price at which the 
goods in question, or similar ones, are sold or offered for sale for 
home consumption in the principal markets of the exporting coun-
try, in the usual wholesale quantities, and in the ordinary course 
of trade. This comparison price must be determined as of the time 
the merchandise is exported to the United States, unless the im-
porter has previously purchased or agreed to purchase it, in which 
case the earlier date is the appropriate time reference. If the cost 
of containers and coverings and any other costs, charges, or expenses 
incident to readying the merchandise for shipment to the United 
States are not already included in the home market price, they are 
added. 
The alternate measure of "foreign market value," called "third-
country price," is used whenever sales in the home market are insuf-
ficient in quantity to form a meaningful basis for comparison,53 or 
when sales or offers for sale in the home market are not "in the 
ordinary course of trade." Third-country price is the price at which 
the merchandise is sold or offered for sale for export to a third 
country; to this figure are added packing and related costs, when 
they are not already included. Where there are export sales to sev-
51. Id. § 163. 
52. Id. § 164. 
53. Home market sales which are less than 25% of all sales made, except those to 
the United States, are ordinarily considered insufficient for this purpose. See example 
given in 19 C.F.R. § 14.7, n.15 (1967). 
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eral countries other than the United States, third-country price 
becomes either the price in that country to which the preponder-
ance of sales are made or the weighted average of sales to all third 
countries, depending on which course of action seems more reason-
able under the facts of each case. 54 
If neither home market price nor third-country price can be 
used to find "fair value," the Act provides a formula under which 
a "constructed value" for the merchandise may be obtained.55 Resort 
to the constructed value formula would be proper, for example, 
when a foreign producer sells exclusively for export to the United 
States. Essentially, the constructed value provision permits the deter-
mination of the cost of production, to which is added amounts repre-
senting reasonable profit, general expenses, and those costs and 
expenses which relate to preparing the merchandise for shipment 
to the United States. In determining the cost of production, the Act 
also permits the Treasury Department to disregard individual trans-
actions which would ordinarily be utilized to establish one or more 
of the cost elements when the parties to those transactions are re-
lated. Since the figures arising from such transactions are presump-
tively distorted, the Act authorizes consideration instead of the "best 
evidence available." It is this standard which the Treasury employs 
to measure the fair value of communist exports. 
IV. APPLICATION TO COMMUNIST IMPORTS 
The Antidumping Act's price comparison tests were adopted 
with apparently no thought given to the problem of determining 
the fair value of goods imported from countries having controlled 
economies. The tests were designed to operate within a free enter-
prise context, where pricing decisions are determined by private, 
microeconomic values. Prices in the command economy, however, 
tend to be based on macroeconomic factors, which include such 
items as estimated social cost and value.56 Since export prices do not 
serve the same social and economic engineering functions as those 
served by domestic prices, it is clear that these two price levels in 
general are not in mutual communication, as the framers of the Act 
evidently assumed would universally be the case.57 Consequently, 
54. Hendrick, supra note 43, at 916. 
55. 19 u.s.c. § 165 (1964). 
56. Wilczynski, supra note 33, at 254. 
57. While the Antidumping Act was being considered in Congress and at the time 
of its passage in 1921, Soviet foreign trade was virtually nonexistent. The possibility 
of trade relations with the U.S.S.R. undoubtedly seemed remote. 
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neither the foreign market value nor the constructed value criteria 
form a completely reliable standard of fair value when brought to 
bear on the products of a command economy. 58 
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical case. An Amer-
ican manufacturer of toy tops files a complaint with the Bureau of 
Customs contending that toy tops from Bulgaria are being sold in 
the United States at less than fair value. Investigation discloses that 
the importer's f.o.b. factory purchase price is $5.00 per dozen. Under 
normal circumstances the purchase price would be compared with 
the wholesale, ex factory price of the merchandise sold in the home 
market for home consumption. Assume that the home market price 
is found to be $5.00. A comparison of these two prices would show 
that no dumping margin exists. 
It is clear, however, that the Antidumping Act would be easily 
circumvented if this case were summarily to be closed with a deter-
mination that there were "no sales below fair value." Since both 
domestic and export prices are manipulated according to a state 
economic plan, and since the exchange rate between local currency 
and dollars is artificial, the comparison is largely meaningless. 
Indeed, the same would be true where the home market price is 
higher than the export price-the more typical situation for consumer 
products. A superficial dumping margin would exist, but a deter-
mination solely on this basis would be founded on the faulty premise 
that commodity prices serve the same function in a command economy 
as in a free economy. Home market price, therefore, fails to furnish a 
suitable indicator of fair value in a command economy. Accordingly, 
the Treasury Department has abandoned reference to home market 
sales where communist imports are concerned, on the basis that domes-
tic sales behind the Iron Curtain do not qualify as sales "in the ordi-
nary course of trade," as required by the statute.59 This interpretation 
of the phrase is supported by the decision of the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals in J. H. Cottman & Co. v. United States,60 a 
case involving domestic sales by an agency of the government of 
Civil war and inflation, the general disruption of the whole economy, the mainte-
nance of the allied blockade of Russia till 1920, unwillingness to trade with Russia, 
the uncertainty of the Russian international status, the vexing question of Russian 
public debts and alien property in Russia-all these reduced trade relations with 
Russia to zero. 
GERSCHENKRON supra note 41, at 14. 
58. "The truth is that when Russia conducts normal profitable trade it looks as 
if she were dumping •••• " Id. at 46. 
59. Portland Cement from Poland, 28 Fed. Reg. 6660 (1963). 
60. 20 C.C.P.A. 344 (1932). 
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Morocco which owned and controlled all rock phosphate mining 
operations in that country, then a French protectorate. The perti-
nent sales were to the only refining factory in Morocco, which con-
ducted business under a contract approved by the Moroccan 
Government under restrictive terms and conditions. Sales of the 
crude phosphate were made to the factory at a price which did not 
include the cost of material. The court held that the term "foreign-
market value," as used in the Act, referred to conditions existing 
in a free, open, and unrestricted market where competitive forces 
are permitted to operate. Domestic sales, therefore, could not be 
considered as being made in the ordinary course of trade, since the 
domestic sales market was controlled as to the use which could be 
made of the commodity sold. The court pointed out that it could 
see no real distinction between markets controlled as to price and 
those controlled as to product use. 
Under the statutory scheme, abandonment of the home market 
price provision calls for the use of third-country price as the next 
preferred test of fair value. A price comparison based on the export 
price to a country or countries other than the United States suffers 
to some extent from the same infirmity as does home market price, 
since export prices to third countries may themselves have been set 
at abnormally low figures to accomplish a peculiarly governmental 
objective. The Treasury consequently rejects third-country price 
as a measure of the fair value of communist exports.61 
There are, however, important differences between home market 
and third-country price situations, which call into question the valid-
ity of the Treasury's apparently categorical disregard of third-
country price as a required or appropriate measure of fair value. 
While domestic sales in a communist country are for the most part 
clearly not in the "ordinary course of trade," because the govern-
ment exercises control over both parties to a transaction and, in 
effect, dictates the terms of the transaction, including price, the 
same rationale does not generally hold true with respect to third-
country sales. The third-country buyer, in a market economy, will 
normally be a free bargaining entity. Since the primary interest of 
communist foreign trade activities is usually the acquisition of hard 
currencies with which to finance needed imports, the foreign trade 
agencies would naturally seek to sell their wares at the highest pos-
sible price, just as would an exporter in a market economy. 
61. Jalousie-Louvre-Sized Sheet Glass from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 8457 (1962). 
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There are additional considerations which support the view that 
the Treasury errs in rejecting third-country price. In the Cottman 
case the Government contended that third-country price was the 
proper basis for determining fair value. The court rejected this ar-
gument on the ground that the third-country purchasers' use of 
phosphates was restricted by contract. For most third-country buyers, 
the sales contract required that the phosphates be consumed by the 
buyer and prohibited their resale. As to Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand, the buyers were permitted to resell the crude phosphate, 
but only for domestic consumption. Impliedly, had there been no 
restrictive provisions on the use of the product, the court would 
have allowed third-country sales by a state trading agency to qualify 
as transactions in the "ordinary course of trade." In addition, the 
Antidumping Act was amended in 1958 to permit "foreign market 
value" to be calculated on the basis of sales or offers "irrespective of 
restrictions."62 Accordingly, it now appears that the Act requires that 
fair value with respect to communist country dumping investiga-
tions be determined on the basis of third-country price. Communist 
sales to industrialized nations of the West would appear to provide 
an appropriate and reasonably safe foundation for price comparison, 
except when dumping might be engaged in on a worldwide basis in 
which case sales to third countries would also be abnormally low. 
The Treasury Department measures the fair value of communist 
exports under the last alternative of the Act, the constructed value 
provision. Since the primary elements in this computation are the 
costs of materials, labor, and fabrication, and since these elements 
are fixed by the state at a value not necessarily reflective of true eco-
nomic value, the Treasury computes the constructed value on the 
"best evidence available," an alternative method permitted by 
the constructed value provision when the evidence of constructed 
value derives from transactions directly or indirectly entered into 
between related individuals or businesses.63 There has apparently 
62. 72 Stat. 585 (1958). 
63. 19 U.S.C. § 165(b) (1964) provides: 
For the purposes of this section, a transaction directly or indirectly between 
persons specified in any one of the paragraphs in subsection (c) of this section 
may be disregarded if, in the case of any element of value required to be con-
sidered, the amount representing that element does not fairly reflect the amount 
usually reflected in sales in the market under consideration of merchandise of 
the same general class or kind as the merchandise under consideration. If a trans-
action is disregarded under the preceding sentence and there are no other trans-
actions available for consideration, then the determination of the amount re-
quired to be considered shall be based on the best evidence available as to what 
the amount would have been if the transaction had occurred between persons 
not specified in any one of the paragraphs in subsection (c) of this section. 
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been no public statement of the theory upon which the Treasury 
Department justifies its use of this approach under the terms of the 
statute. It seems plain, however, that typical transactions in commu-
nist countries, which would ordinarily be regarded as establishing 
the various elements of constructed value, are not transactions be-
tween related parties within the meaning of the Antidumping Act.64 
In administering the Act on this basis the Treasury Department 
refers to the production of similar articles in Western Europe as the 
best evidence available.65 Accordingly, an article manufactured in a 
nearby West European country is selected as a substitute for the 
article in question. In practice, the purchase price of the substitute 
article sold to the United States market has usually been adopted as 
the fair value standard after it has been adjusted to an ex factory price 
in the chosen West European country. Adjustment is also made for 
measurable differences in quality and production efficiency between 
the communist country and the manufacturer in Western Europe. 
The purchase price of the communist article has then been measured 
against the adjusted price of the West European article to determine 
whether price discrimination exists.66 
Taking, for purposes of illustration, our hypothetical case involv-
ing Bulgarian toy tops, suppose that Sweden was the only West 
European country which produced toy tops for the United States 
market which were roughly similar in size, quality, and other char-
64. See Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the 
Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 CoLUM. L. REY. 189, 226 (1965) for the view that 
the Treasury Department is not free to disregard costs of production transactions, 
because § (b) encompasses only "customs transactions." 'While Mr. Coudert's conclu• 
sion as to the Treasury's authority may be correct, his reasoning would seem to be 
in error inasmuch as (1) the purpose of the provision is to construct a home market 
price (a price in which no customs transactions would be involved) and (2) § (b) on 
its face declares that transactions between related parties are to be disregarded "in 
the case of any element of value required to be considered [under § (a) which does 
in fact encompass cost of production transactions]." (Bracketed material added.) 
65. This practice was instituted in 1960 in Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. 
Reg. 6657 (1960), the first communist country dumping case to result in a determina-
tion of price discrimination. It should be noted, however, that the Treasury's approach 
to the problem is not without precedent among trading nations. A 1958 GATT report 
states: "In practice, countries levying anti-dumping or countervailing duties on imports 
from state-trading economies very often rely on the price situation in comparable 
third markets .... " GATT, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 15 (1958). 
66. It should be noted, however, that if the home market price of the substitute 
article were considered the "best evidence," which logically it is, since 19 U.S.C. 
§ 164(b) (1964) was designed to construct a home market price, the Treasury Depart-
ment would be faced with certain administrative burdens not otherwise present. For 
example, a ·west European manufacturer would not normally have real incentive to 
cooperate with investjigators of the Bureau of Customs in supplying price lists and so 
forth, since he is not actually the subject of the investigation. 
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acteristics. Suppose further that the price of Swedish toy tops for 
export sale to the United States (purchase price) is $6.00 per dozen. 
Investigation shows that the Swedish tops are of somewhat better 
quality, since they are painted with a comparatively high-grade 
enamel, whereas their Bulgarian counterparts are painted with a 
cheaper grade of paint. The Treasury Department, let us say, quan-
tifies the difference at 2¢ per top or 24¢ to the dozen and adjusts the 
Swedish purchase price accordingly. The resulting price, $5.76 per 
dozen (assuming no other adjustments are in order) is taken by the 
Treasury Department as the fair value standard against which the 
purchase price of the Bulgarian toy tops is measured to determine 
whether price discrimination exists. Since the Bulgarian purchase 
price is $5.00 per dozen, a comparison reveals a dumping margin of 
76¢ for each dozen Bulgarian toy tops exported to the United States. 
While it may not conform in all respects to the letter of the law, 
the administrative treatment of communist country dumping cases 
attempts to deal with the problem realistically in order to accom-
plish the primary objective of the law-the prevention of dumping. 
There is, however, serious doubt whether the present Treasury prac-
tice in fact accomplishes that objective satisfactorily. Thus, by com-
paring the purchase price of the communist importation with an 
adjusted price for the West European article based on its price to 
the United States market, rather than its price in the home market, 
the result may still not be an accurate measure of fair value. The rea-
son is that the price for the West European article might itself be an 
abnormally low, or dumped price. The Treasury Department, gen-
erally speaking, would not know this, unless a complaint had been 
received as to that West European article, or the fact was othenvise 
brought to its attention. Therefore, what may actually be a dumping 
price would appear non-discriminatory on the basis of this com-
parison. 
In addition, an appropriate substitute article may not be manu-
factured in a non-communist country. This was evidently the situa-
tion in a case involving wooden headboards imported from Yugo-
slavia.67 As it turned out, however, the investigation revealed that 
the Yugoslav Government had permitted this particular industry to 
operate on an experimental, profit motive basis. It was decided that 
the usual fair value tests could suitably be applied. 
67. Headboards from Yugoslavia (Notice of Tentative Determination of No Sales 
Below Fair Value), 30 Fed. Reg. 8016 (1965) ("It was also determined that neither 
such nor similar headboards are imported from other countries.'). 
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Another difficulty may inhere in differences in economic char-
acteristics between the exporting country and the West European 
country in which the substitute article is produced. In circumstances 
in which the article in question, or one similar to it, is produced in 
several non-communist countries, it is to be expected that the one 
to be chosen for comparison purposes will be the one most closely 
approximating the communist country in industrial development, 
standard of living, level of market demand, and so forth. Investiga-
tion in a particular case might disclose, however, that there is no 
economically comparable country producing a substitutable article.68 
While adjustments could be made for the more immediate and mea-
surable differences in efficiency between the plants concerned, it is 
uncertain whether this would be enough to yield an accurate 
picture. 
It would be difficult to deny that the legal, as well as conceptual, 
framework for dealing with dumped communist imports is less than 
satisfactory, and needs to be re-cast in anticipation of an increased 
volume of imports from East Europe. Fortunately, past communist 
dumping cases have been relatively few in number, a fact which 
accounts for the absence heretofore of a full-blovm controversy on 
this issue. From 1934 through March 1967 there were approximately 
557 dumping investigations, of which fifty-two involved communist 
countries. In only ten of these instances did the Treasury Department 
determine that the merchandise was being sold to the United States 
market at less than fair value. 69 The Tariff Commission subsequently 
determined that in eight of these cases no injury or threat of injury 
resulted from communist imports at discriminatory prices.70 The first 
dumping finding against communist imports was issued in 1960 
68. See, e.g., Fishery Products from U.S.S.R. (Determination of Sales at Not Less 
Than Fair Value), 32 Fed. Reg. 5375 (1967), in which fishery products from the 
Sheikdom of Kuwait were relied on to establish the fair value standard. 
69. Information obtained from the Bureau of Customs, 'Washington, D.C. 
70. The Tariff Commission has experienced difficulty in handling the injury aspect 
of communist country dumping cases. See l S. Metzer, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
765, 766 (1966), quoting an excerpt from a Treasury Department memorandum on 
the administration of the Antidumping law, as follows: 
In an early 1955 decision involving East German potash, three Commissioners 
indicated in their judgment that any sale by a Communist country was in and 
of itself injurious. The other three Commissioners concluded there was no injury, 
and since this was before the 1958 amendment to the law directing that equally 
divided opinions of the Commission were to be considered as positive injury 
determinations, the case was closed on a determination of no dumping. Subse-
quent cases involving Communist or Communist sympathizing countries have 
been decided without reference to political philosophy, as indicated by no-injury 
determinations in the Czech montan wax and Cuban rayon staple fiber cases and 
the injury decision explained purely on economic grounds in the Czech bicycle 
case. 
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against bicycles from Czechoslovakia. That finding was revoked in 
1964, and at present there is only one communist country decision 
outstanding.71 
v. OTHER APPROACHES TO COMMUNIST DUMPING 
A. Countervailing Duties 
Under the United States countervailing duty law, foreign com-
modities which receive upon production, manufacture, or export 
a bounty or grant from the government of the exporting country, 
or any instrument thereof, are subject to the assessment of a counter-
vailing duty equal to the amount of the subsidy.72 Unlike the Anti-
dumping Act, comparative price levels and the question of injury 
are immaterial.73 Countervailing duties could be imposed even if 
the export price were too high to be competitive in the United 
States market or if the volume were too small to injure or threaten 
to injure domestic industry. As previously brought out, export sales 
prices in the communist state are fixed as a rule at the going world 
market price, without regard either to domestic price or the cost of 
production.74 To the extent that such prices fall below the aggregate 
of cost of production, transportation, and related expenses, the com-
modities involved may properly be considered subsidized, since the 
state must bear the loss. There is reason to believe that a substantial 
quantity of exports from European state trading countries are 
bounty-fed in this way. According to a United Nations report, issued 
in 1958, Hungarian and East German exports, for example, were 
found to be heavily subsidized.75 
71. Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 12925 (1967) (the Tariff Com-
mission's determination of injury). At the time of this writing the formal "dumping 
finding" had not been published. 
72. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964); 19 C.F.R. 16.24 (1967). 
73. Article VI, para. 6(a) of Part II of the GATT provides that no countervailing 
duty shall be imposed unless the effect of the subsidization is such as to cause or 
threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard 
materially the establishment of a domestic industry. The United States, however, 
expressly reserved its accession to Part II of the GATT to permit administration of the 
countervailing duty law without regard to the question of injury: 
Subject to the reservation that the amendments contained herein to Part II of 
the General Agreement will not be applied except to the fullest extent not incon• 
sistent with legislation which existed on October 30, 1947 and reserving the right 
to accept the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade subject to a reservation 
that Part II thereof will be applied to the fullest extent not inconsistent with 
legislation which existed on October 30, 1947. 
GATT, Status of Multilateral Protocols, PROT/2/Rev. 2, at 6.03 (Aug. 1964). 
74. Text accompanying note 28 supra. 
75. United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe 1957, VI, at 22-29 (1958). 
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It seems clear, then, that underpriced communist exports to the 
United States could be countered by invoking the existing counter-
vailing duty statute. Surprisingly enough, there has never been a 
countervailing duty investigation involving communist imports, al-
though it is patently advantageous for a domestic producer, who 
seeks to discourage foreign competition, to file an appropriate com-
plaint with the Bureau of Customs for the purpose of having such 
an investigation initiated. The explanation probably has its roots in 
the history of the Great Depression, when the Soviets flooded the 
world markets in 1930 and 1931 with large quantities of grain, lum-
ber, and several other commodities at disruptively low prices result-
ing in the "Russian dumping debates."76 They acquired thereafter 
a reputation for dumping which lingers and colors Western attitudes 
toward Soviet trade, and communist trade in general, whenever the 
subject is considered, and which tends to inhibit fresh approaches to 
the problem. 
Unquestionably, there would be some administrative difficulty 
in determining the amount of governmental subsidy in bloc coun-
tries, given the complexity of their pricing structure and the prob-
able difficulty of obtaining pertinent information. However, the fact 
that the statute leaves considerable room for the exercise of admin-
istrative judgment as to the amount, as opposed to the existence, of 
a bounty or grant tends to minimize the problem. Fixing the 
amount of export subsidy might, indeed, be an easier administrative 
task than determining fair value according to the standards now 
employed under the Antidumping Act.77 In addition, treating low-
priced imports under the countervailing duty statute would, in the 
absence of an injury requirement, relieve the Government of the 
cost and inconvenience associated with an injury investigation con-
ducted by the Tariff Commission. 
An additional argument in favor of a countervailing duty ap-
proach stems from the view that it is less stigmatic than a finding of 
dumping. When applied to a state trading agency, a dumping order 
is tantamount to a finding that the government of that state is guilty 
of an "offense against the legal order," involving unfair and discrim-
inatory practices.78 Important political and diplomatic ramifications, 
76. Gerschenkron, supra note 41, at 31. 
77. The pertinent part of 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964) provides: "The Secretary of the 
Treasury shall from time to time ascertain and determine, or estimate, the net 
amount of each such bounty or grant, and shall declare the net amount so determined 
or estimated." (Emphasis added.) 
78. Davis, The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1428, 
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not ordinarily present when a market economy exporter is the sub-
ject of a dumping finding, are obviously involved in such circum-
stances. The Soviet Union, particularly, appears to be intent upon 
establishing itself in international public opinion as a normal trader, 
and has been sensitive to dumping charges for that reason.79 On the 
other hand, a finding that a bounty or grant has been bestowed on 
the exports of a particular country, thereby calling for the imposi-
tion of countervailing duties, will not usually have the same political 
and diplomatic consequences, since a countervailing duty provision 
is generally regarded as one of many measures forming a nation's 
purely protective tariff policy, as opposed to its antitrust policy, and 
as such does not embody-at least not to the same degree-what is 
essentially a reproach for engaging in a ·wrongful, perhaps predatory, 
trade practice. 
Militating against the use of the countervailing duty law in its 
present form is the probability that it would serve to stifle, rather 
than encourage, East-West trade contacts. Inasmuch as a great many, 
if not most, of the commodities exported from communist countries 
receive a state subsidy, and since the subsidized price as a general 
rule is only intended to match the world market price, the imposi-
tion of a surtax would effectively cut off the bulk of bloc exports 
from competition in the United States. Certain refinements, how-
ever, if added to the United States countervailing duty law as ap-
plied to state trading economies, might remedy this complaint. The 
imposition of the duty might be conditioned, for instance, upon a 
showing of injury to American industry, as in the Antidumping Act, 
or a showing that the subsidized price was below the average Amer-
ican domestic price for similar goods sold under similar conditions. 
B. The Price Floor Approach 
Belgium deals with low-priced imports from state trading econ-
omies by applying a standard which has both countervailing and 
antidumping duty characteristics.80 Under this standard, the export 
1439 (1966). Professor Davis characterizes dumping practices as having a "tortious or 
quasi-criminal quality." Id. at 1439. 
79. East-West Trade Hearings 146 (Frank). 
80. Antidumping and countervailing duties are generally thought to be closely 
related in theory, as illustrated by the description of countervailing duty provisions 
contained in a 1926 memorandum of the Economic and Financial Section of the 
League of Nations, viz. as measures designed to counteract "bounty dumping." Tren-
delenburg, Memorandum on the Legislation of Different States for the Prevention of 
Dumping, With Special Reference to Exchange Dumping, PREPARATORY Co111111. FOR THE 
INT'L ECONOMIC CoNF.-DocUMENTATION, Doc. No. E.C.I. 7, at 6 (1927). 
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price of a particular good is compared with the lowest aver-
age price (the price floor) for similar merchandise either pro-
duced in Belgium or imported from a free market country and 
sold or offered for sale in the Belgian domestic market. If the export 
price is lower than the price floor, a special duty equal to the differ-
ence between the two is levied on the good when it enters Belgium.81 
This difference may result, in whole or in part, from either govern-
ment subsidy or from the type of price discrimination condemned 
in our Antidumping Act; in either case, the evil is remedied by the 
imposition of the special duty. The Belgian approach, unlike that 
of the United States' countervailing duty law, does not reach those 
subsidized exports priced above the Belgian competitive market. It 
has additional merits from the standpoint of administrative ease, 
certainty, and protective effect. Nevertheless, its flaw is that it does 
not recognize the possibility of genuine low-cost production in a 
communist society. Even though the low price of a particular article 
might in fact reflect efficient production techniques, rather than 
state subsidization or price discrimination, that part of the export 
price which falls below the price floor would still be brought up to 
standard by the imposition of the special duty. 
C. Bilateral Trade Agreements 
In recognition of both the difficulties and the dangers of trading 
with communist nations, many West European countries have en-
tered bilateral intergovernmental trade arrangements with bloc 
members. Bilateral "programmed trade agreements" are in fact the 
preferred means by which communist states conduct their foreign 
trade. This approach, if adopted in the United States, would have 
the virtue of restricting imports to a volume which would not ma-
terially injure domestic industry.82 It has been suggested that among 
their terms such trade agreements could contain prohibitions against 
dumping and provisions for panels to arbitrate and settle dumping 
disputes. Trade agreements would also obviate any dangers to our 
national security posed by the following possibility: 
the communist state trading agency or agencies may buy from us 
huge quantities of industrial machinery, plant and equipment, and 
the like that would contribute substantially to their own economic 
and military power while selling to us caviar, vodka, and mink, 
81. GATT, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 46, 49 (1958). 
82. East-West Trade Hearings 107 (Berman). 
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thereby contributing to our luxuries and distracting us from our 
necessities. 83 
Bilateral agreements, however, are themselves vehicles for discrimi-
nation in international trade, and as such negate the principle of 
equality in trading opportunity traditionally followed by the United 
States; the adoption of this appreach would serve to cement the 
respectability of bilateralism, to perpetuate state trading, and to 
undercut our basic commitment to multilateral trading, whereby 
a country is able to buy where the cost of production is cheapest 
and sell to those markets offering the highest price. 84 
D. Mutilateral Adoption of Antidumping Rules 
A number of proposals have recently been made to the effect that 
rules governing dumping activities by communist countries should 
be agreed upon and adopted by Western trading nations. In that 
connection it has been suggested that the policy of NATO countries 
toward East-West trade be unified in the form of a code of fair trade 
practices governing commercial dealings with the Soviet bloc.85 
Among other things, such a code would call for agreement by bloc 
members to observe the GATT rules on dumping. Neither the So-
viet bloc nor the West, however, are likely to find much guidance in 
the GA TT, which merely sets dmvn general guidelines for the con-
duct of a state trading enterprise without providing any specific pro-
cedures for regulating dumping by such an enterprise.86 A fair 
practice code would only beg the dumping question unless it actually 
spelled out workable techniques for dealing with the problem. 
Negotiations to establish an International Antidumping Code 
were entered into at Geneva in 1966 under the auspices of the 
GATT.87 While these proceedings afforded an especially propitious 
83. Id. 
84. A bill was introduced in the 86th Congress to establish a United States Trading 
Corporation for the purpose of meeting the threat of Soviet economic warfare whic4 
appeared acute at that time. Among other things, this would have created an effective, 
though somewhat extreme, remedy for the dumping problem with respect to imports 
from state trading nations. H.R. 2159, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 274, 450, 453, 496 (1959). 
85. East-West Trade Hearings 2 (Senator Javits). 
86. GATT, art. XVII. See c. KINDLEBERG.ER, FOR.EIGN TRADE AND THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY 172 (1962) for the observation that: 
Attempts to work out criteria bY, which to determine the presence of dumping in 
the General Agreements on Tanffs and Trade were met by a statement of Czecho-
slovakia . • • that different criteria were needed for socialist than for capitalist 
countries. No progress was made in developing such criteria, however, in the 
absence of information on production costs. 
87. United States Submits Paper on Dumping Code, J. OF COMMERCE, Jan. 27, 1966, 
at I. See CoNG. R.Ec. 6496 (daily ed. May 9, 1967) (remarks of Senator Hartke to the 
effect that the U.S. Antidumping Act can only be made to conform to the pending 
International Dumping Code by legislative action). · · 
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opportunity for members of the GATT to meet squarely the prob-
lem of state trading, the subject was apparently not seriously 
broached. The final version of this code does not deal with the 
problem, although subsequent amendment to the code in this re-
spect is not inconceivable. In addition, an appropriate international 
forum for the resolution of this problem is afforded in connection 
with the current negotiations for Polish accession to the GATT.88 
A comparatively detailed provision as to the treatment of dumping 
complaints involving Poland would provide a welcome precedent 
for dealing with imports from state trading countries in general. 
The proposal has also been advanced that the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) should take the 
initiative in facilitating and boosting trade with Eastern Europe on 
a multilateral basis, and incidently to formulate a unified antidump-
ing policy for the relatively advanced free world countries which 
comprise its membership. The proposal is sound, but it remains to 
be seen what fruit it will bear. 
E. World or Regional Market Price 
In principle, it is hard to view the claimed practice of state trad-
ing corporations in fixing export prices to conform to world market 
prices as per se unfair or inappropriate in commerce with free mar-
ket countries. It would appear, therefore, that adoption of a price 
averaging technique as an emblem of fair value, would provide, in 
most instances, a workable approach to the administration of anti-
dumping measures where communist imports are concerned. Rather 
than an average world market price, however, a weighted average of 
prices for similar commodities in the markets of the industrial West 
or Western Europe alone, adjusted for differences in circumstances 
of sale, would not only furnish a more easily accessible source for 
price figures, but would also establish a more realistic "fair value" 
standard under the United States Antidumping Act. Prices for sim-
ilar articles produced in less developed countries, especially if pro-
duced primarily for domestic consumption, might be distorted or 
otherwise not adequately reflective of the stage of economic and in-
dustrial development reached by the East European country con-
cerned. These prices should probably be excluded from the mix. 
There are those who maintain that the concept of dumping 
88. Declaration on Relations Between Contracting Parties to the GATT and the 
Government of the Polish People's Republic, PROT /2/Rev. 2, at 36 (Aug. 1966). 
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is not relevant in the context of East-West trade because of 
the discordant price systems involved, and that the issue of "market 
disruption" or "injury" alone should govern our treatment of com-
munist imports.80 Whether or not the application of the dumping 
law to communist imports creates a conceptual malocclusion, it is 
capable in its present form of preventing market disruption, once it 
has been determined that the price of the imported merchandise is 
unfairly low. The adoption of a regional market price (that is, ad-
justed world market price) as the standard of fair value would ap-
pear to be a reasonable cure to the present price comparison defects, 
and would re-vitalize the Antidumping Act as a serviceable and effec-
tive guardian against injurious, low-priced imports from Eastern 
Europe. 
Moreover, it would appear that the regional market price con-
cept could be adopted by administrative interpretation within the 
existing statutory framework. Under the Antidumping Act the ab-
sence of home market sales in the ordinary course of trade requires 
consideration of the price at which the merchandise is sold in the 
ordinary course of trade to countries other than the United States. 
Since communist countries claim that their export prices are set to 
mirror average world prices for like or similar merchandise, it fol-
lows that the prices for communist exports to third countries may 
reasonably be equated with world prices. On that basis the world 
price (subject to customary adjustments) would constitute a valid 
third-country price under the Act. The Bureau of Customs, follow-
ing its usual practice, would make an independent calculation of 
average world price for purposes of verification of the price figures 
furnished by the state traders. It is, of course, a matter of adminis-
trative discretion as to the methods used to establish an appropriate 
world price. Any difference between the figure submitted by the 
exporter and that found to be proper by Customs might, for ex-
ample, be attributed to an adjustment in price not recognized un-
der the statute (where the communist export price is actually lower 
than the adjusted world price) and, therefore, disallowed as a deduc-
tion from the presumptive third-country price (world price). 
CONCLUSION 
The prospect of enlarging United States trade relations with the 
Soviet bloc undoubtedly causes some trepidation in the business 
89. GERSCHENKRON, supra note 41, at 46. 
140 Michigan Law Review 
community, at the same time that the promise of new market out-
lets attracts it. The need for proper protection against unfair com-
petition, and for accommodation of a disparate economic system to 
make trade possible, calls for fundamental changes in the present 
treatment of communist country imports under the Antidumping 
Act and the administrative practices which have grown up under it. 
As presently conceived and applied the antidumping law is too nar-
row in concept to constitute an adequate legal instrument for coping 
with low-priced imports from command economies. 
It is important to note in this connection that a number of bills 
to amend the Antidumping Act have been introduced in the past 
few years. The chief proponent for such changes is Senator Hartke 
whose bill, S. 1726, introduced in the 90th Congress would give the 
United States antidumping law a decidedly protectionist character, 
raising a non-tariff trade barrier at a time when the principal foreign 
trade policy of the United States is trade expansion.0° For the purpose 
of this study, however, the significant feature of these legislative pro-
posals91 is that they would in effect adopt or ratify the present Trea-
sury Department practice with respect to imports from communist 
countries, a practice which, according to the foregoing analysis, 
must be considered an inadequate solution for anything other than 
a small volume of trade with the East. 
90. See Adams & Dirlam, supra note 44, at 28. 
91. In the 90th Congress Senator Hartke has introduced S. 1726 for the purpose 
of amending the Antidumping Act. The bill is virtually identical to S. 2045 which he 
introduced in 1965 in the 89th Congress. 
